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A call for international accountability—preserving hope 
amid false protection
Today’s struggle to control the Ebola outbreak in west 
Africa is a reminder that trust within health systems is 
absolutely crucial to ﬁ ght disease—not only locally, but 
also globally. We describe Rwanda’s experience with 
a breakdown of communication, accountability, and 
trust that threatened the great strides in malaria control 
made over the past decade. 
Rwanda has formalised a series of national strategic 
plans since 2005, all of which rely on evidence-based 
methods to combat the burden of malaria. A key 
component of this arsenal includes a commitment to 
achieve universal coverage of long-lasting insecticide-
treated bednets, especially for the most vulnerable 
people (eg, pregnant women and children under 5 years 
of age).3 Coupled with robust policies on health-system 
strengthening, these plans have achieved dramatic 
reductions in malaria morbidity and mortality.2,3 
Yet, Rwanda witnessed an unprecedented rise in 
malaria cases in 2012 (table). Rwanda’s Ministry of 
Health responded in accordance with its national 
strategic plan and with means approved by WHO. 
Millions of additional WHO-recommended long-lasting 
insecticide-treated bednets were distributed in districts 
with a high burden of malaria and to all children younger 
than 5 years of age. 
Unfortunately, unlike during previous upsurges, the 
number of malaria cases continued to rise,  despite these 
eﬀ orts. The predictable reasons for this rise, such as the 
expansion of water bodies for rice cultivation, climatic 
anomalies, and increase in insecticide resistance,5,6 could 
not fully explain the sharp rise in malaria cases after 
these interventions, so Rwanda’s Ministry of Health 
actively investigated the issue.  
Results of national laboratory analyses completed 
in September, 2013, revealed that the distributed 
insecticide-treated bednets were impregnated with 
suboptimum concentrations of insecticide and thereby 
failed to meet WHO-required bioeﬃ  cacy standards for 
prequaliﬁ cation.7 These results were later conﬁ rmed by 
the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.8  
On learning of the substandard product, Rwanda’s 
Ministry of Health removed the bednets from 
circulation nationwide and had to identify an alternative 
course of action to protect its people. Although even 
fully operational and eﬀ ective bednets alone could 
not have prevented the rise in malaria, the ineﬀ ective 
product only exacerbated the challenging situation. 
To have invested in the purchase and distribution of 
a substandard product, only to have to subsequently 
remove it, was not only a waste of money but also of 
precious time that could have been devoted to other 
crucial development priorities.  
In October, 2013, 1 month after Rwanda had recalled 
and replaced the substandard bednets, Member 
States received notiﬁ cation8 from the WHO Pesticide 
Evaluation Scheme that this particular brand of bednets 
were no longer recommended for use, owing to their 
substandard performance in trials7 of their eﬃ  cacy 
against malaria. Of particular concern, however, was 
that this recommendation had been made in July, 2013, 
nearly 4 months before Rwanda and several other 
countries were notiﬁ ed of these ﬁ ndings by WHO.7
Such an unnecessary delay serves as a sobering reminder 
that we must expect and demand greater international 
accountability in the global health arena. It is alarming 
that WHO did not alert Member States sooner, so that 
health authorities could make expedient and informed 
decisions to protect their people from malaria. 
Withholding information about substandard products 
erodes trust in the international normative agencies 
that are supposed to protect the interests and rights 
of vulnerable people. Moreover, concerns about the 
inﬂ uence of non-state actors (eg, business interests) 
on international agencies are not alleviated by these 
types of incidents.9 Erosion of trust and perception 
of bureaucratic ineﬃ  ciency might translate into 
budget shortfalls for entities such as the WHO, which 
would hamper its ability to manage global health 
challenges, such as the Ebola crisis, in the present and 
2011 2012 2013 2014 (as of October)
Malaria cases 208 498 481 868 934 484 1 081 028
Deaths due to malaria 380 459 412 352
Source: Rwanda Biomedical Center, Ministry of Health, 2014
Table: Malaria burden in Rwanda, by year
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the future. Profound reform, especially with respect to 
accountability, is needed of such an institution.  
Indeed, accountability is a two-way street. Too often, 
however, the emphasis on international accountability 
is directed unilaterally at aid recipients. Indeed, Member 
States and their leaders, politicians, programme 
managers, and health-care providers should be held 
accountable for being good stewards of limited 
funds and providing high-quality services to recipient 
populations. At the same time, international normative 
organisations should be expected to provide timely 
and accurate responses in alignment with their mission 
to improve health. International businesses should be 
liable for selling substandard health products when such 
negligence can have deleterious health consequences.
When products for prevention of lethal diseases, 
such as malaria, are compromised, epidemics spread 
unnecessarily, and progress towards development can 
be halted. At the very least, international normative 
agencies should respond by coordinating themselves 
to develop coherent policies and regulations that can 
assist Member States to fulﬁ l their duties and to ensure 
that private interests do not put lives unnecessarily at 
risk. Failing to do so comes at a cost, not only to health 
but also to the trust we place in these organisations 
to serve as partners in a quest to combat complex and 
challenging roots of human suﬀ ering.
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